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1. Introduction
The interpretation and characterization of the Dutch system of Industrial Relations is more
difficult than ever in the last 100 years. During the first half of the 20th century there was a
process going on of increasing collectivization. After the Second World War the Dutch system
was clearly structured along democratic corporatist lines for a period of about 20 years. A
huge welfare state was built, while economic growth continued on a historically high level.
The breakdown of the international gold/dollar standard, two severe oil crises and a world
wide depression meant a complete change in atmosphere: the animal spirits of the investors
shifted from an optimistic towards a pessimistic state.
During the sixties already, there was a tendency towards decentralization and less
intervention of the government. In the early sixties, especially the employers' organizations
strived for more industrial differentiation. In the late sixties, especially the unions strived for
less government intervention into the wage determination process. When the hausse in the
world economy came to an end in the first half of the seventies, the Dutch government decided
to a tight wage policy during the rest of that decade. As far as the bargaining parties were free
to decide upon labour conditions, there was bargaining most on the industry, but to an
increasing degree on the firm level.
From 1979 on the unemployment rose sharply, which led to a break in the confidence
policy makers had in their Keynesian approach. In 1982 the government promised the unions
and the employers' organizations not to intervene into the (wage) bargaining process anymore.
On the central level only 'Recommendations' were formulated. At the industry level the main
Collective Labour Agreements (CLA's) were concluded. The big companies had their own
CLA's for already a long time, fitting their own situation. The government saw it as its main
task to make its own financial position more sound: lower deficits and a lower debt ratio.
Now, after 8 to 10 years of decentralised wage bargaining and restructuring of govern-
ment finance there is some economic improvement, but in social terms there is nearly no
improvement at all. Economically we see an improvement of government finance in terms of
lower deficits and debt ratios. Moreover there is improvement in terms of economic growth
and even with respect to the employment level. Socially spoken however, we see almost no
improvement. During the eighties the unions have been modest in their wage claims, as is
expressed in a structural decrease in the wage share. However, the income inequality has
arisen and the unemployment nearly lowered.
As already said the developments in the area of industrial relations are difficult to
interpret. We observe examples of further collectivization - the agenda of the CLA-negotia-
tions has grown. The role of the Central Consultations may have changed, but not diminished.
But on the other hand there are examples of deregulation and privatization. So it is difficult to
decide to a process of centralization or decentralization or to characterizing Dutch industrial
relations by processes of collectivization or privatization. In fact there is only one unambigu-
ous development and that is a process of integration of the area of industrial relations and the
area of social security, with the organizational framework of the labour market policies as the
bridge.
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An authoritative book on Dutch industrial relations, written in english is: J.P.Windmuller, Labor1
Relations in The Netherlands, Cornell University, 1969. For more recent publications see also: J.
Visser, Continuity and Change in Dutch Industrial Relations, ch. 7 in G. Baglioni, C. Crouch (eds.),
European Industrial Relations, Sage, London, 1990; and: J. Visser, The Netherlands: The End of an
Era and the End of a System, ch.10 in A. Ferner, R. Hyman (eds.), Industrial Relations in the New
Europe, Basic Blackwell, 2nd edition, 1993.
In this article we will make an assessment of the recent trends and critically discuss the
consistency of current Dutch institutions. In the second section we will give a short overview
of the origins and further development in the system of industrial relations. In a third section
we will deal with some recent trends. Then we will make a particular characterization of the
current Dutch situation, also by comparing it with the situation in other European countries. In
a fifth section we discuss the sclerosis of the Dutch labour market and in a sixth section we
will deal with a number of institutional inconsistencies. We end up with an epilogue, in which
we look back to what we have said in order to better look ahead to see what must happen to
improve the situation.
2. Developments in the System of Industrial Relations
The first local union was founded in 1861 when a group of typographers decided to found a
service for unemployed and ill people and to strive for improvements in the labour conditions
of the employed. This was the beginning of a process that transformed the determination of1
wages, including social benefits and the availability of basic services, from an individual to a
collective issue. Especially the socialist oriented workers strived for a universal system of
collective bargaining about everything important for the community as a whole. Besides the
socialists the christian oriented organizations have played a major role. In contrast with the
socialists who interpreted the union as an instrument in the hands of the workers in their class
struggle against the capitalists, the confessional parties have always strived for cooperation
with the capitalists. In their opinion both parties has to convince each other of the common
interests by means of consultation and moral suasion.
When we look at the history of the first half of the 20th century, we can say that under the
socialist threat of general strikes and revolutionary activities, the employers agreed to an
increasing extent to consultations with the unions in order to cooperate with them. The
process of collectivization of the industrial relations can be illustrated by a number of impor-
tant landmarks. Under the pressure of the Railroad strike in 1903, the conservative-confes-
sional government developed legislation with respect to wage determination. In 1907 it was
regulated that collective bargaining results would be valid for all union members, irrespective
the question whether or not the members had already concluded private contracts. After the
First World War there was much social upheaval, leading to more political influence of unions,
directly via the socalled Labour Council in 1919 and indirectly via the introduction of universal
suffrage for men in 1917 and for women in 1921. This have had a tremendous influence on the
political power relations. In 1927 a law was adopted regulating that not only members of a
union, but all workers of a particular firm that concluded a collective labour agreement with
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the unions fell under the jurisdiction of the contract. Under the influence of the Great De-
pression and its potential to political instability, the conservative-confessional cabinet decided
to a number of laws, of which, for our subject at least, the Law on the Extension and Nullifica-
tion of Labour Agreements (1937), was the most important. This law has given the Minister of
Social Affairs the authority to extend the jurisdiction of a particular contract, resulting from a
collective bargaining process, to all other firms and workers in the industry in which the
contract is concluded. Moreover has the Minister the authority to nullify a particular collective
agreement, when he considers the contract to be damaging for the general interest.
After the Second World War the government decided about the wage level during the
first 10 to 15 years. In the first years of recovery the unions and employers' organizations
(together called "the social partners", to illustrate the end of the class struggle), did not have
much influence on the government's decisions. Later on the government took its decisions to
an increasing extent after consultations of the social partners. From 1953 the Dutch economy
was turned back in a near equilibrium situation. Because this was not only true for The
Netherlands, but for most economies in the Western world, a period of high rates of economic
growth began. The Dutch unemployment figure fell to a very low level. The employers'
organizations began to grumble about the central wage policy of the government. It forbade
the employers to compete with each other on the labour market by means of wage increases.
In 1959 the Liberal party was substituted for the Labour party in the cabinet. This centre-right
government promoted some decentralization with respect to wage bargaining. The target was
to get some industrial differentiation in the wage increases. Although the government tried to
moderate the development of the wages, huge increases occurred in 1963, 1964 and 1965. In
the same period several laws were in preparation to introduce important social services and
related issues. During the second half of the sixties government expenditures concerning social
services and security, house construction, education and health care began to rise. At the
same time unions put growing pressure on the government not to intervene into the process of
wage determination. Although in 1970 the economy was "in equilibrium", a look at the
financial structure of the private firms would have shown to the politicians of the time that the
process of profit squeeze that was going on, would ruin the economy sooner or later.
The oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent international depression was the immediate
cause for the recession and depression of the economy during the second half of the seventies.
The government, dominated by social democrats and progressive confessionalists, tackled the
crisis in a Keynesian way: increasing government spending and a policy of wage restraint. The
policy was a success when we look at the unemployment figure, which rose only slightly. The
state of government finance however, was alarming. When the second oil crisis of 1979
dashed slightly positive expectations, unemployment rose sharply and was it clear for most
politicians that the time had come for a strategic change. In 1982, the Lubbers administration
of a centre right signature, announced a no-nonsense policy for the next decade, implying huge
government spending cuts and decentralization of wage bargaining where the government
promised to abstain from intervention. The autonomy and the own responsibility of the social
partners was stressed. The results were an improvement in terms of government finance,
inflation and economic growth, but unemployment remained unacceptably high. At the end of
the eighties it was clear however that a further restructuring of government finance was
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needed, and for a substantial fall in the unemployment rate, ongoing wage restraint and a more
flexible institutional framework of the labour market had to be considered as a prerequisite.
In the following section we will deal with a more thorough analysis of recent trends in
Dutch industrial relations.
3. Recent Trends in Dutch Industrial Relations
As already said, from 1979 on the unemployment figure began to rise, in the same year when a
law was adopted regulating linkages between wages and social benefits.
When Lubbers became the prime-minister of a christian-democratic and liberal cabinet in
1982, a new period had come. He promised the social partners not to intervene into the pro-
cess of wage bargaining. The social partners agreed to a policy of wage moderation, profit
recovery and redistribution of employment. The government's contribution to this develop-
ment would be a restructuring of government finance, leading to lower debts, interest rates
and tax burden. To achieve this, the cabinet took a number of tough decisions: sharp cuts in
the level of expenditures, in particular with respect to the big spending fields: social benefits,
education and health care. Social benefits, although linked to the wages in the private sector,
were cut with 3% and, as also happened with the legally regulated minimum wage, nominally
frozen for a number of years.
In the period of Lubbers II, the Law on the Adjustment Mechanism, in which social
benefits, wages in the collective sector and wages in the private sector were linked with each
other, was suspended (1986). During every fall Consultations were held between the Cabinet
and the social partners. In some years the parties decided to Agreements, in which they
formulated a number of recommendations to the negotiating parties on industry or firm level.
In earlier days these Agreements contained maximum wage increases and was its implementa-
tion easily be monitored by the government. Because of the high number of unemployed, wage
arrangements had become less necessary because both social partners declared themselves
convinced of the strategy of wage restraint. But the necessity of employment agreements rose.
Employers however, have never been prepared to fix employment levels. So the arrangements
they concluded to in the Central Consultations, changed from character and have to be
interpreted only as targets now.
Not only the unemployment had arisen to unacceptable levels. The same happened with
the number of recipients of other benefits. Especially the number of sick and disabled persons
showed disastrous increases. The policy reaction to these developments was twofold. First the
cabinet decreased the rate of the disability benefit from 80% to 70%. Further decreases
appeared to be socially and politically unacceptable. Second became the government aware of
the necessity to organize the social security system more efficiently.
It is from this time that the organizational circuits of industrial relations on the one hand
and that of the welfare system on the other hand became more integrated. Up to then the
world of CLA-bargaining dealt with wages and other labour conditions. To an increasing
extent employment, training and social security affairs play a role in that circuit now. The
world of social security organization was a rather autonomous world. But the huge cost
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The disability gap is defined as the difference between the sickness and disability benefit rates2
before and the rates after the legal reform. See for the figures: Department of Social Affairs and
Employment (SOAFEM), CAO-afspraken 1993, juni 1994.
increases have raised doubts with respect to the efficiency of that circuit. Because of the
strong interconnection between the practical problems in the field of social security, training,
wages and employment, an efficient approach would indeed imply a better integration of both
circuits. Especially in the nineties we see that this process of integration is going on.
In fall 1990 the Central Consultations produced a Declaration directed towards a push
back of the number of disabled persons, the amount of sick-leave and the level of unemploy-
ment among ethnic minorities. In the same year the Public Employment Services began to
operate in a reorganized form. The restructuring was meant to get the social partners more
involved into the implementation of labour market policies.
In 1991 the government presented proposals in the Parliament for a drastic change in the
treatment of ill and disabled workers. A more stringent control was combined with lower
benefit rates for shorter periods and to premiums, which became different for the various
industries and firms.
With respect to the determination of wages, unions became sick of continuing wage
moderation. For already about 10 years they had accepted very low wage increases. The
competitiveness of the Dutch economy, expressed in unit labour costs, had increased signifi-
cantly. But increasing profits and solvency had not led to a significant increase in employment,
expressed in man years. Social upheaval in the Rotterdam harbour was the beginning of a
period of unrest in various other industries, leading to growing tensions between industrial
unions in flourishing sectors on the one hand and the central organization of unions on the
other hand. With hindsight we can say that the central organization have appeared to be rather
successful in isolating the harbour from the rest of the economy. The harbour workers
achieved a high wage increase, which was not followed by other industries.
Because the economic foresights were bad, and the government was not sure of continu-
ing wage moderation by the social partners, the 1980 Law that regulated the linkages between
benefits and wages, was changed. In the adapted law the linkages were made conditional to
the economic and social performance. Especially the ratio between the inactive people
receiving a benefit and the number of employed became an important indicator on the basis of
which the Minister of Social Affairs can decide every year whether or not it is justified to
maintain the linkage.
This tough approach of the government was not appreciated by the union rank and file.
Especially the measures focused on the sickness and disability arrangements were reasons for
serious conflict. The union and employers' leadership negotiated about what they called the
disability gap and in 1993 about 85% of all workers were covered by CLA's that contained a
complete suppletion, undoing all the changes regulated by legislation. This strategy had the2
unintended effect of bringing the practice of the government to automatically extend CLA's to
the whole industry on the political agenda.
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See for the figures: Department of Social Affairs and Employment (SOAFEM), CAO-afspraken3
1991-1992, May, 1993.
See Department of Social Affairs and Employment (SOAFEM), CAO-afspraken 1994, February,4
1995.
In 1991 and 1992 the wage negotiations on industry and firm level were influenced by
optimism with respect to the economic development. The results reflected this optimism: 3.5
and 4.4% contract wage increase respectively. The currency crisis in september 19923
however, made clear that the economic situation in Europe was not that good. Central
Consultations led to the request to bargain about adjustments of existing contracts and not to
renew expired contracts for a couple of month. The resulting increase in the contract wage
was 3.5%, which was lower than the 1992-figure.
As already said the economic development in 1993 was worse than expected. During the
Fall Consultations the three parties agreed about the necessity of not increasing the wages.
Because of this consensus the government decided not to announce a wage stop. When we
look at the contractual wage increase for 1994, we see that the social partners have kept their
promises (0.8%).
For 1995 the main issue on the agenda of the Central Consultations was the gap that has
grown between the legally determined minimum wage on the one hand and the CLA-regulated
minimum wage on the other hand. Because of the nominal freeze of the legally determined
minimum wage during the period 1984-1989 and from 1992 until now, the gap has grown
during the last period. In 1991 it was about 10% and today it has grown to about 15%. The
figures presented are averages. When we look at the gaps for specific groups, we get different
figures: people in the age of 16-20 face a very large gap; for instance 19 years old workers
face a gap of 31.3%. Plasterers even face a gap of 46.3%.4
Because a significant part of the unemployed are un- or low skilled, the need for jobs in
the income interval of the gap is strong. The parties in the Central Consultations have agreed
to create a significant number of jobs in the income area just discussed. Another major point
was the creation of jobs for ethnic minorities, among which the unemployment is also
excessively high. The government was prepared to create extra jobs for long unemployed.
Information about the results up to now (october 1995) indicate some success. The
ambitious target of 60,000 jobs for ethnic minorities may be achieved. And the results with
respect to the placement of long unemployed in the collective sector are encouraging. The
1995 Fall Consultations dealt with the continuation of the employment programmes with
respect to ethnic minorities and long unemployed by fixing new targets. The unions appeared
only prepared to continue wage moderation as the employers' organizations were prepared to
accept a programme of labour time reduction. Up to now Dutch employers were never happy
with these kinds of ideas. So it is uncertain what will be the outcome.
A last point playing a role is the re-integration of formerly disabled persons. In the period
1995-1996 a medical re-examination of all disabled persons has started. It will take years to
examine all the persons, younger than 50 years old. As we look at the results up to now, more
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than half of the group has got a lower or even a zero percentage; where the percentage
expresses the degree of disability.5
For that part for which a person is able to work, he gets an unemployment benefit, of
which the rate is lower than the disability benefit rate. The Central Recommendations will also
deal with the need for a re-integration of those persons. At the industrial, firm and regional
level the parties must negotiate how to organize this process of re-integration.
Looking ahead the agenda of the Central Consultations and subsequent industrial and firm
bargaining will be dominated by employment targets and social security affairs. Labour time
reduction and early retirement arrangements will appear to be tough matters, of which the
payability will become very problematic. Moreover the effect of labour time reduction in terms
of decreasing unemployment may be doubted; the number of workers who have two jobs is
already rising.
The international developments will have a growing influence on the results of the
bargain. In a small open economy with free trade on all markets, the room for independent
social policy is smaller than in a large relatively closed economy. So growing global competi-
tion on all markets makes serious reflection on the institutional framework necessary.
4. Characterization of Dutch Industrial Relations
In industrial relations literature the distinction between centralised versus decentralised
bargaining is very important. The criterion that is decisive for the characterization is the level
on which the decisions are formally taken. The problem with this method is that informal or
cultural factors are ignored. At least for The Netherlands the socalled structural approach
would give an unacceptable bias to the interpretation of crucial developments. Careful6
analysis of what happens in the industrial relations world makes clear that on all levels parties
are aware of the fact that developments on the central level are very important. The main
reason for this importance is that Dutch workers have a strong inclination to compare their
labour market position with other groups. Related with this characteristic have Dutch unions
always asked from workers to be solidaristic with each other. The potential of the economy at
large has always been an argument in the (decentralised) bargaining about wage increases.
This implies that the Dutch centre plays an important role in the coordination of wage
developments and in the achievement and maintenance of full employment. If the centre fails
to fulfil its coordinating role, it would have negative consequences for the economic and social
developments.
Looking at the situation of the Dutch industrial relations in the eighties and nineties, we
see that the Central Consultations do really play an important role. In terms of structure the
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significance is nearly zero. The only thing the centre is allowed to do is producing recommen-
dations. But as a platform where information exchange takes place, and where opinions are
made, also about the actual power relations, the Dutch centre is indispensable for a well
functioning of the labour market. During every fall the parties meet each other in the formal
context of the Labour Foundation. Then they coordinate their policies and look whether it is
necessary to make formal recommendations to the parties on the industry and firm level. In the
eighties the social partners on the central level agreed to wage moderation and for the
government this was sufficient to promise not to intervene into the process of wage bargain-
ing. When in the nineties some industrial unions became sick of wage moderation, the
government decided to help the central unions in their attempt to get their rank and file
disciplined. They considered to freeze wages and to reconsider its right, not to say its habit, to
extend CLA's. In fact the role of the centre is to push the negotiating parties on the industrial
and firm level to a result that is in accordance with the free market model that is used in
mainstream economics. Without such a policy push from the centre, full employment would be
an utopia. Looking at the performance of the Dutch economy today, the push from the centre
is insufficiently strong to achieve full employment.
Another distinction can be made in terms of collectivization versus privatization. The core
of the industrial relations system is the collective bargaining institution. A system of private
bargaining leads to unemployment, poverty and inequality. So a country has to set up a
collective system. In the case of social security the same arguments can be used. Looking at
the performance of the mixed economies however, one gets the idea that the organization can
be improved in terms of efficiency. The mix of private and collective activities has led to a tax
burden which has become a serious bottleneck for economic growth and high employment. To
solve this problem one must look for more efficient labour institutions. The attempt to re-
organize the implementation of labour market policies from a governmental towards a
corporatist approach, now appears an unlucky step. The growing influence of private employ-
ment services, accepted by the government by adapting legislation, also reflects a change in
the organizational mix; their incidence appears very fruitful. A further step is the abolishment
of the Sickness Act. So there is a process going on to privatize parts of the social security
system and related labour market affairs. We can expect this process to continue, because it
suits perfectly the overall development of privatization that is going on in other markets.
In general we must say that political strategy making with respect to labour institutions
will necessarily remain a collective affair. The implementation however, may to an increasing
extent be more and more contracted out to private organizations in the near future.
In the introduction we have said that it was very difficult to characterize the current
Dutch situation. The reason is that the Dutch are cautiously looking for the optimal institu-
tional mix. What kind of organizations must do what kind of activities and on what level? The
increase of the number of issues on the agenda of the Central Consultations indicates a process
of collectivization and centralization. The increase of the number of CLA's, on the firm as well
as on the industry level may imply collectivization. When looking at the legal reform with
respect to sickness and disability, we can characterize it as decentralization and privatization.
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When looking at the contract wage increases, we see a very uniform development. So we7
cannot conclude to a process of decentralization that would be going on. This result is in
contrast with conventional wisdom.
Another way of characterizing the Dutch situation, is a comparison with the situation in other
European countries. Therefore we will introduce two classifications of systems, derived from
recent Industrial Relations research. The first is the distinction between systems focussed on
consensus and systems characterized by conflicts, developed by Dell 'Aringa and Lodovici
(1994). Central European countries, such as the Scandinavian countries, Germany and Austria,
were able to gradually install corporatist institutions, on the basis of consensus with respect to
the distribution of wealth and power. In this way they were able to maintain social peace.
Looking at the rates of economic performance, social peace appears to be a profitable
collective investment good. On the other hand we have countries characterized by conflictuous
relations. Here we can introduce a subdistinction between pluralist and oligopolistically
structured societies. Pluralist societies are characterized by many but relatively small conflicts.
The USA is a good example and Thatcher has brought the United Kingdom into this class,
since the eighties. Oligopolistically structured societies however, are dominated by a small
number of groups. In Western economies the main conflict is between capital and labour and
between various labour groups. The intra-labour controversies have to do with the blue versus
the white collars, the private versus the public sector labour, and the marxian or the social
democratically or the confessionally oriented groups. Regularly these groups struggle with
each other, in constantly changing coalitions. France, Spain and Italy are good examples of
this subclass. When looking at the economic performance we can see that pluralist societies
perform better than the countries with an oligopolistic structure.8
A second classification is that of Esping-Anderson (1990). His extensive empirical
research led him to distinguish between a conservative, a liberal and a social democratic sy-
stem. Although his classification is especially designed to describe welfare systems, we can use
it for our industrial relations purposes very well. A conservative industrial relations system
then is focussed on the regulation of the labour market, leaving the social stratification intact.
This implies that only redistribution takes place between 'members' of the same stratum. So the
'natural' hierarchy will be preserved. The social democratic system is focussed on the regula-
tion of the labour market in a way that creates order by means of a marked increase in equality
with respect to wealth and power. So in contrast to the conservative policy, the social stratifi-
cation is significantly changed in an egalitarian direction. The third system distinguished is the
liberal system. It creates order by giving the poor a minimum of resources, making it possible
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for them to have a living and possibly increase their own opportunities. In the liberal view
government interference must remain individual freedom intact as much as possible.
To characterize the different European countries in terms of the Esping-Andersen
classification, we can typify Scandinavia as social democratic, Germany and Austria as
conservative and the UK as liberal. Italy, Spain and Belgium have a system that is a mix of
social democratic and conservative elements.
Now we can give The Netherlands a place in the European landscape. During the fifties there
was an almost perfect consensus of a democratic-conservative kind, between capital, various
labour groups and government about the distribution of wealth and power. During the sixties
there was a remarkable shift towards more conflictuous relations of an oligopolistic structure.
Under the pressure of a long during hausse social democratic influence increased, especially
via unions. During the seventies the government regained some power, because of the9
atmosphere of crises resulting from the huge increases in the oil prices. During the eighties,
under the pressure of high rates of unemployment, governmental intervention in the wage
development appeared to be unnecessary and we can observe a growing influence of liberalism
at the cost of the influence of social democratic thinking. Now we are in the nineties, the only
clear development is the growing influence of liberalism on the Industrial Relations design at
the cost of the conservative corporatist elements. Privatization of executive agencies, less
generosity with respect to social benefits and more company CLA's are an illustration of this
tendency. It is impossible to predict the development in the Dutch system in the near future. If
we assume that there are no remarkable, unforeseen developments, then liberalization of the
system will go on for a while and will reach a point that fits Dutch culture most. Then the time
has come to improve the discipline of the Dutch people with respect to their own rules.
In the next section we will look at the sclerosis which is supposed to be a principal characteris-
tic of the Dutch labour market.
5. The Sclerosis of the Dutch Labour Market
When one looks at the figures expressing economic growth and unemployment, 1973 can be
considered as a turning point. With hindsight we can say that the measures taken to prevent or
to counter depression and poverty, have appeared to be hindrances to recovery. The world
depression of the seventies has hit the Dutch economy in a way that made it impossible for the
Dutch to return to equilibria rather soon. In Table 1 we have presented a number of key
variables and we can see that economic growth and unemployment did not return to pre-
seventies levels. When we look at the profitability of investments, we see that long periods of
wage restraint have had positive effects. However, up to now this has not led to structural
-11-
increases in the investment ratio (see Table 2). Apparently investors have not changed their
mood with respect to Dutch competitiveness. Most watchers of the Dutch economy focus
their attention to government finance. Some improvement is achieved and the international
financial markets have sufficient confidence in the guilder because of its stability relative to the
German mark. The debt ratio however, remains rather high. Another point to bother about is
the high number of inactive persons who get a social benefit. Even when we exclude the
pensionaries, the number is very high. Therefore it is not surprising that the tax burden is,
according to most watchers, unacceptably high (see for the figures Table 1).
When we take all these data together, we have a good overview of the Dutch sclerosis.
On all levels of governance many measures are taken. But the figures show that the lack of
adjustment or sclerosis has not been exorcised.
Table 1 Some Key Figures (in percentages)*
61-73 74-93 74-83 84-91 92-93
GDP-growth 4.8 2.0 1.6 2.9 0.8
Unemployment 1.1 7.1 5.4 9.2 7.4**
Labour share 80.3 85.9 89.6 84.1 85.6
Tax burden 41.1 50.8 49.7 51.7 52.3
Government deficit 4.0 5.9 5.9 5.7 3.6***
Source: CPB, Centraal Economisch Plan 1995, the Hague, 1995.*
Because of the generosity of the Dutch disability fund, these figures are biased. When we look at the number of**
benefit recipient expressed as a ratio compare it with the number of employed and express the relationship as a
ratio. the 80s show an average of 80.6%. The period 1991-1996 show an average of 82.9%.
The deficits of the government, including the local government are very persistent leading to very high Gross***
Debt ratios of the Dutch collective sector (in the nineties about 80% of GDP).
Source: Composed of figures found in: CPB, Centraal Economisch Plan, 1980, 1992 and 1995, the Hague.
Thinking about the phenomenon of sclerosis we can distinguish between four factors that play
a role in the reaction speed of subjects in disequilibrium.
In the first place the history of the subjects. If for instance workers have the experience that
predictions of employers with respect to the effects of wage changes are wrong most of the
time, they loose confidence and are not willing to concede on the basis of new predictions.
More generally, subjects use their past experiences to build up emotions, habits, traditions and
pictures of the world. On this basis they react on changes in their situation. Relevant for the
Dutch labour institutions was the experience of the unions in the sixties that, in contrast to
what the employers' organizations had said all the time, ten years of significant wage increases
did not have any negative effect on the employment. Workers got used to increases, and
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employers' organizations got used to conceding to union claims. When after such a stable
period drastic changes in the environment take place, the economy is full of inertia.
In the second place the changes in the environment. If for example the environment
changes from a simple and stable context to a complex and dynamic one, an economy will
unavoidably show larger disequilibria. Not any country have appeared to be able to smoothly
adjust to new equilibria, when two oil crises hit the world economy. Of course it is also true
that some economies are more vulnerable to particular developments in the environment than
others.
Table 2 Some Financial Key variables (in percentages)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
capital share 18.7 6.4 5.3 12.3 19.8 17.3
profit share 13.6 1.0 -0.9 5.4 12.9 10.2
profitability 10.7 3.0 2.1 6.1 10.4 8.7
(own capital)
solvability 48.7 42.6 39.8 41.0 43.7 43.9
investment 20.2 16.8 17.2 17.7 17.4 16.3
Source: Centraal Planbureau, Onderzoeksmemorandum, No. 115, A.P. Kusters, -
Winstgevendheid en vermogensverhoudingen, the Hague, 1994.
Two related factors make that the global environment will keep its complex and dynamic
character: the accelerating technological progress (especially the information technology), and
the emerging global competition on all sorts of markets. In earlier days the comparative
advantage of a country in trade was described in terms of geographic characteristics. Nowa-
days, experts speak in terms of competitive advantage, meaning the capacity of an economy to
adjust to constantly changing environments.
In the third place we can ask the question whether the institutions offer enough room for
adjustment to changes in the environment. For instance are there norms restricting overtime,
work by women, or elderly people. Are there internalised norms telling unemployed or
disabled people that society cannot ask from them to change from profession or to change
from social ranking. Are there norms or legal rules making it impossible for the employer to
fire people if they are not profitable enough, or rules saying that workers within a firm cannot
be replaced to another department involuntarily. So we can think of many traditions, habits,
norms or rules that limit the possibility to immediately adjust to changes in the environment.
On the other hand we must recognize that institutions are not only limiting the possibilities to
adjust. It may also function as definitions of the room in which subjects are located. This
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makes it possible for them to calculate costs and benefits of the various activities that can be
developed. Without an institutional framework interpretations of reality in general, and cost
benefit calculations to asses the profitability of a particular project, are difficult to make. In
extreme situations this leads to apathy and inertia. So the problem is how to develop institu-
tions that can be considered as optimal: stimulating profitable action and restricting unprofit-
able action and passivity.
In the fourth place can we look at the institutional flexibility. If groups, organizations and
societies discover that their institutions, although very valuable, can only be maintained at
increasing costs, would they be able to monitor this and to react upon this fact. In other
words, how aware are people with respect to the costs and benefits of their institutions. Our
conjecture is that institutional awareness is one of the most difficult things to develop. People
are hardly aware of their traditional or habitual kinds of behaviour. Unawareness is one of the
characteristics of it. When people talk about norms and values, about their morality, for most
of them it has an absolute value and must be accepted irrespective the price.
Taking these four factors together, we must say that institutional awareness is basic for a
sophisticated analysis of the efficiency of a particular framework. Historically determined
institutions must be audited regularly and adjusted if necessary. So an optimal institutional
framework can emerge that gives a maximum incentive to profitable activities. When looking
at the globalisation of the economies, we can imagine that there will also be an emergence of a
market for institutional frameworks. Institutional competition will mean that badly functioning
frameworks will disappear. People will change from political stand and vote or struggle for
different institutions. If collective strategies fail, emigration towards economies with more
efficient institutional frameworks may be considered.
In the following section we will discuss a few characteristics of Dutch labour institutions to
see whether there are possibilities to improve the institutional consistency and flexibility. So
we want to contribute to more institutional awareness, necessary for having a regular
institutional audit.
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6. Inconsistencies in Dutch Labour Institutions
With respect to the process of wage determination the most important decisions are taken by a
number multinational firms and by industrial bargaining. Some CLA's appear to be wage lea-
ders; the rest of the CLA's are followers. This leader-follower phenomenon results from the
socalled solidaristic wage policy that dominates union thinking. The phenomenon can be
explained by sociological theory that says that every individual has other individuals or groups
in mind with which he compares himself. If the group to which is referred gets something, he
considers it fair to get it as well. This theory of the reference groups is in contrast with the
mainstream economics approach that says that every individual only looks at his own inputs
and outputs. The question is now how people decide about their reference groups. In our case
of wage comparison the solidarity principle says that people with equal labour input must get
the same wage. So an unskilled worker in the electronics industry in the North-eastern part of
The Netherlands must get the same wage as an unskilled worker in the electronics industry in
the South-western part of The Netherlands, irrespective his productivity. If one considers the
capitalist class as the owner of an economy and therefore as the only responsible group in the
production process, then one can reason along these solidarity lines. Then the working class is
only responsible for delivering input, irrespective the conditions. So the money value of output
sold that is produced by a unit of input is determined by decisions which are taken by the capi-
talist class; that means completely beyond the control of the labour class. So conditions must
not play a role in wage determination; only the labour input. In a central planning economy
this would be a consistent principle. But in a market or mixed economy this way of thinking is
an anomaly.
As soon as one considers labour as also responsible for the results of doing a particular
job in a particular firm and in a particular region, then the wage must also have some connec-
tion with the money value of the output per worker that is sold. Then there can be significant
differences between the different wages earned by offering equal inputs. Unfortunately many
European unions apply the specification of the solidarity principle in the wage determination,
as is just explained; and this leads to equal pay for different performances. As long as unions
stick to this rule of equal pay for equal input, then it must not be surprised that the reaction of
the markets will be a lower demand for labour that is located at a place where it is overvalued.
The literature on the Scandinavian approach to wage inflation analyses under which (extreme)
conditions this wage policy will not lead to unemployment. In other words, in general this10
will induce unemployment.
When we look at the socalled linkage problem in The Netherlands, then we see a striking
similarity with the solidaristic wage policy. The civil servants want the same wage increases as
are paid in the private sector. And for all kinds of social benefits solidarity must mean that they
all get the same increases as is arranged in the private sector. When we imagine the extreme
case in which the big multinationals, operating in highly capital-intensive industries and
characterized by large labour productivity increases, pay their personnel according to the
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P.K. Keizer, De koppeling, doelmatig noch rechtvaardig, Economisch-Statistische Berichten,11
20-02-1991; p. 196-200.
SOAFEM, CAO-afspraken 1994, February, 1995; p. 39. Almost 90% gets the following12
average disability benefit rates: 89% in the first year, 73% in the second year; then 70%.
A few month ago a law is adopted making employers fully responsible for ill employees. May13
be an adaptation will take place in the near future, because doubts has arisen with respect to
the effects of this piece of legislation.
productivity rule and all other sectors, including the "social, inactive industry", get the same
increase, it is easy to show that this would ruin the economy. We can conclude that the
solidarity principle as applied by the Dutch unions is neither fair nor efficient. Fortunately the11
principle is applied only partly. The followers do not follow perfectly. But it would be better
to recognize the flaw in the principle and to look for other approaches, which are more fair
and more efficient.
With respect to the necessity of a more austere welfare system the Dutch government has
decided to lower the benefit rates in case of sickness and disability (1991, 1992). The reaction
of the "social partners" however, was that they decided to what they called a reparation of the
social security legislation. They agreed in the CLA's that the employers would pay the
difference between the benefits as they were before the legal reform and as they were now
arranged by legislation (the socalled disability gap). In place of a nullification of that kind of
CLA's, the Minister of Social Affairs decided to extend these agreements. The result is that in
many cases the sickness benefits are back on their 80-100% level, while most of the disability
benefits are back on their former 80%-level.12
Fortunately other measures taken to decrease the volume of sickness and disability
benefit recipients appear to have a positive effect. With respect to sickness the measures have
made the employer more responsible: he must pay the first two and in some cases the first six
weeks, before the ill people are paid by the sickness fund, which is organized industrially.13
These measures were an incentive for the employers to spend more time on monitoring and on
improving the working conditions and on personnel policy. Also with respect to the disability
benefits measures are taken that have made the employers more responsible.
Moreover the administration of the social security system has started a project in which
all disability benefit recipients are medically re-examined to look whether they are full time
disabled for every job or whether it is possible to mark a person as part-time or full time abled
with respect to jobs that fulfil a number of conditions. In many CLA's the negotiating parties
have agreed that firms would develop personnel policies where room is made for a re-
integration of formerly disabled people.
Although the measures taken must be welcomed as a necessary element in the political
attempt to get a more austere welfare system, there will remain a severe problem. If employers
are made more responsible for the sickness of their personnel, they have a stronger incentive
to get rid of all workers that do not have a perfect health. When in such a climate the CLA
asks from the firms to accept more formerly disabled people, then both policies are counter-
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acting each other. If the re-integration of formerly disabled people fails, the project of medical
re-examination has only had the effect of a decrease in the benefit rates (the unemployment
benefit rate is lower than the disability benefit rate). If one really strives for re-integration a
more sophisticated approach is necessary.
With respect to the level of the social minimum in The Netherlands, in most of the CLA's
parties have agreed to the creation of jobs with a wage level between the current CLA-level
and the minimum wage as defined by legislation. In the years to come we will see the results of
it. The reason however why optimism is not justified, is that one can doubt whether in that
range of about 15% employers can create the huge amount of jobs needed for a significant
drop in the number of benefit recipients. Employers regard most inactive people as risky
elements. Some people are formerly disabled, others are long unemployed or have little work
experience. In situations where firms are uncertain with respect to the future, they will not
invest in people who need much guidance. This means that wage decreases of 15% will not be
enough to significantly reduce the unemployment. One can even doubt whether wage
decreases are the only necessary instrument. Skills training (intellectually as well as mentally)
and accompaniments are also necessary ingredients of a successful policy package.
As we have seen in the foregoing the reorganized Public Employment Service plays an
important role. After its start one of the first problems they had to face, was a severe cut in the
budgets they received from the government. May be the reason was distrust of the government
in the capacity of the organization to fulfil the intended role. If this assumption is true, the
government must quickly decide to completely reorganize the whole administration of social
security, job search and training. As it is organized and equipped now, we cannot expect
something else than failure. Up to now Sweden has the most sophisticated system of active
labour market policies. But we must hope that The Netherlands do not make the Swedish
mistake to replace about 80% of the unemployed and retrained people in the collective sector.
That would make it nearly impossible to get a lower tax burden, which is very desirable in
Sweden as well as in The Netherlands. The challenge must be to get people placed in the
private sector. In that sense it is to be regretted that the purple cabinet has adopted a plan to
create 40.000 jobs (socalled Melkert jobs, named after the Minister of Social Affairs) in the ...
yes ... collective sector. One of the reasons for Melkert is, of course, the fact that replacement
in the private sector is more difficult, especially when dealing with problematic groups. But we
must recognize that we cannot continue to solve the social problem by simply letting the
collective sector grow, as we have done during the sixties and seventies.
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Although we did not deal with the macro context, we must be aware that macro developments14
must fulfil a number of necessary conditions for succesful macro and micro policies with
respect to the labour market.
D.J. Snower, Converting Unemployment Benefits into Employment Subsidies, American15
Economic Review, 94(2), p. 65-70. Snower warns us for the danger of giving vouchers to
persons that also would have got a job without a voucher and the possibility of substituting
people with a voucher for employed people. See for a discussion of
the effects of welfare provisions also: A. Lindbeck, The Welfare State and the Employment Problem,
American Economic Review, 94(2), p. 71-75.
7. Epilogue
Looking back to the Dutch policies, continuing wage restraint for already a very long time has
improved Dutch competitiveness. Together with continuing cuts in government expenditures,
it has led to a more proper financial situation for firms and government. But this approach has
appeared to be only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a huge decrease in the
number of social benefit recipients. To achieve this, three other things are necessary as well:
(1) The EU must stimulate European spending, especially by investing in European infra-
structure;14
(2) Dutch Central Consultations must focus especially on the employment and social wage
problem; a nominal freeze of contract wages would be wise; every firm then must be
obliged to introduce a system of profit sharing and investment wage, of which the
specification is subject to CLA-bargaining. In order to improve the micro efficiency on the
labour markets, CLA-bargaining must set on the agenda a widening of the wage scales.
Not only on the lowest levels, as it happens at the moment, but for all ranks. This must
make wage increases for individuals or particular vocational groups easier. The extension
or nullification of CLA's must be part of the Consultations.
(3) The Dutch must set up an organization that really integrates social security, unem-
ployment registration and a sophisticated system of labour market information; on the
basis of adequate information this organization must help people in finding jobs; the
search must not only be focused on jobs, but also on appropriate training facilities.
The first point is the Keynesian solution to the problem of unemployment. Small open
economies are not fitted for the job of Keynesian policy making. So we need a more central
level; in our case the EU looks the appropriate one.
The second point must make the labour markets more flexible on the individual level. Too
long is wage policy regarded as only a macroeconomic affair. We must realise that both forms
of wage policies will always be necessary, the macro as well as the micro component.
The third point is focussed on the organization of active labour market policies. Private
employment agencies must be welcome on this market. But a commercial organization cannot
help the poorly endowed people. The development of a voucher system as proposed by
Snower could be helpful here. In that case the task of the government is primarily the15
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allocation of various sorts of vouchers among the different target groups. Also in this case is it
time for institutional innovations to improve the efficiency of social policies.
-19-
